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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee.

Case No. 20050754-CA

vs.
ROBERT MITCHELL,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Whether the trial court erred in its denial of Mitchell's motion for a new trial?
This issue is reviewed under an "abuse of discretion'* standard. Slate v. Pirela, 65 P.3d
307. 310 (Utah App. 2003). This issue was preserved in a motion for new trial ~*iled
within ten days of sentencing (R. 194) and through the subsequent filing of supporting
affidavits (R. 203-05, 208-11).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All controlling statutory provisions are contained in the Addenda.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Robert Mitchell appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment and the

denial of his motion for a new trial after he was convicted of theft, a second degree
felony, and criminal mischief, a second degree felony, in Fourth District Court before the
Honorable Claudia Laycock.

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Robert Mitchell was charged by criminal information filed in Fourth District Court

on September 30, 2002, with theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated § 76-6-404, and criminal mischief, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Annotated § 76-6-106(2)(c)(d) (R. 1). On February 14, 2003 a preliminary hearing
was held and Mitchell was bound over for trial upon a finding of probable cause b> the
trial court (R. 27, 237: 28). On February 27, 2003 Mitchell was arraigned and plead not
guilty to the charges (R. 30).
On April 6, 2004 Mitchell filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence
relating to prior convictions and other bad acts pursuant to Rules 403, 404(b) and 609 of
the Utah Rules of Evidence (R. 103-09). Mitchell re-filed the motion on August 19, 2004
(R. 129-35). On August 20, 2004 the trial court denied this motion (R. 148, 240: 15-18).
On August 23-24, 2004 a jury trial was held with Judge Claudia Laycock
presiding. After deliberating for almost 2.5 hours, the jury found Mitchell guilt)' of both
counts (R. 153-159A, 186-87, 235, 238). At the close of the State's case, Mitchell made a
motion to dismiss the theft charge alleging that the State had failed to prove the "purpose
to deprive'* element (R. 235: 46-47). Mitchell also made a motion that it was improper
2

for him to be charged with both theft and criminal mischief under the ShcmdeJ doctrine;
and that criminal mischief should merge into the theft charge (Id. at 47-49).
On October 7. 2004 Mitchell was sentenced to 36 months probation. In addition,
he was ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $1,160.00 and was ordered to pay
restitution totaling $14,990.32 (R. 190-92).
On Monday. October 18, 2004 Mitchell filed a Motion for New Trial alleging that
jurors considered evidence not presented at trial in rendering their decision, and on the
basis of newly discovered evidence (R. 194). On November 8. 2004 the State filed a
response alleging that the motion for new trial should be dismissed because it was not
accompanied by ''affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in support of the motion"
(R. 197-99).
On November 12. 2004 Mitchell filed a request for an extension of time in v.hich
to obtain and file all attachments necessary to his motion for a ncv\ trial, citing Ru e 34(b)
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that, "If additional time is
required to procure affidavits or evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the
motion for such time as it deems reasonable" (R. 201-02).
On November 22. 2004 an affidavit from Brooke Karrington. a private
investigator, was filed by Mitchell in support of his motion for new trial (R. 203-05).
Kairington interviewed jurors and learned the following: One. that it was the consensus
of the jury that Archuleta was involved in the incident and that he'd been offered a
favorable deal from the State in exchange for his testimony against Mitchell. Two, that
this was an assumption made by the jury rather than gleamed directly from any evidence.
Three, that the jury was frustrated that the State had arranged a plea agreement w ith
Archuleta but not Mitchell.
3

On January 10, 2005 a second supporting affidavit of Karrington was filed by
Mitchell (R. 208-11). In this affidavit, it was Karrington's sworn statement based on an
interview with Cecil Henningson, the owner of the truck that formed the basis of the theft
charge. According to Karrington, Henningson told her the following: One, that Archuleta
lives on the same street but that he didn't know that until after the first court hearing.
Two, that Henningson had not met Archuleta until after that first hearing when he ran into
him in the neighborhood later that night or the next day. Three, that he did not see
Archuleta on the early morning of the incident as had been reported to police by
Archuleta. Four, that Henningson now believes that Archuleta was involved in the theft
and ransacking of his truck because of what he knows.
On August 2, 2005 Judge Laycock issued a written ruling denying Mitchell's
motion for a new trial (R. 222-30).
On August 30, 2005 Mitchell filed a notice of appeal in Fourth District Court (R.
232).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
A. Testimony of Cecil Henningson
Cecil Henningson works for Commander Concrete and as part of his employment
he is provided with a company car, a 1999 silver Ford F350 that he has driven since July
of 2002 (R. 238: 93-94). The truck has a big flatbed and tool boxes with "Commander
Concrete" decals on the side (R. 238: 94). On Sunday, August 4, 2002 the truck was
"stolen" out of Henningson" s driveway (Id. at 94, 131).
Early that morning at approximately 3 a.m., Henningson was awakened by the
sound of the truck backing out of the driveway (R.238: 95). He ran outside and saw that
4

the truck was indeed gone before calling 911 (Id.). As he was on the phone with dispatch
he saw the uwtruck coming off of the street just below" (Id.). He heard the engine die and
then start again (R. 238: 117). Henningson again exited the house and from
approximately his mail box, he saw the truck was being driven off the hill (R. 238: 96,
109). Another vehicle was following the truck (R. 238: 116). Henningson had left the
keys in the truck, hanging from the steering column on the tip wheel with the doors
unlocked (R. 238:98).
Henningson testified that he had given no one permission to use the truck (R. 238:
97-98). At the time of this incident Henninson did not know Robert Mitchell nor give
him permission to take the truck (R. 238: 98). When he went outside after the truck had
been taken, he didn't observe anyone on the street but didn't really look around (R. 238:
110).
At around 11 a.m. on the same morning, Henningson received a call from; the Utah
County Sheriffs Department that the tuck had been located in the Highline CanaL east of
his home in Salem (R. 238: 99). He went to the canal and saw his trucked parked in it.
nose down with water up to the hood on the driver's side and up over the hood on the
passenger side (R. 238: 100). The truck was not rumiing and a broom, that was kept in
the truck, was lodged between the gas pedal and the back of the seat (Id.).
A tow truck pulled it out of the canal and took it to there impound lot before it was
taken to Smith Ford for repair (R. 238: 103). Once repairs were completed, Henningson
picked it up and paid for the repairs with a check (R. 238: 104). He couldn't remember
the cost of the repairs and he turned the receipt in to his employer (Id.). Exhibit #4 is a
receipt from Smith Ford showing the cost to be just over $14,000 and then an additional
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$500 was paid for carpet replacement (R. 238: 105-06). Henningson testified that prior to
the time the truck was stolen, it had needed no repairs (R. 238: 106).

B. Michael Richard Atwood
Michael Atwood is a resident of Salem; his address is 122 North 550 East (R. 238:
119-20). During the first weekend in August of 2002, a palm pilot was taken from his
suburban which was parked in his driveway (Id. at 120-21). A few days later he reported
it to the police after hearing from some neighbors that there had been some burglaries in
the neighborhood (R. 238: 122). The palm pilot was returned to him by the Spanish Fork
police after Atwood had a discussion with Steve Adams, a Spanish Fork officer (Id. at
123-24). Atwood went to the Spanish Fork police department on August 22nd.
approximately 2 weeks after it had been missing, and was able to identify the palm pilot
by serial number (Id. at 124). Atwood testified that he is able to hear the difference
between a diesel truck engine and a regular engine but that he didn't hear a diesel iruck
on the night the palm pilot was taken (Id. at 125-26).

C. Scott Dibble
Scott Dibble is a detective with the Salem Police Department (R. 238: 132-33).
On August 4, 2002 at approximately 10:30 a.m. he was contacted by dispatch about a
truck that had been found submerged in the Highline Canal (Id. at 133). The canal is used
for irrigation purposes and begins at the mouth of Spanish Fork Canyon and follows the
base of the mountain from Spanish Fork to Santaquin (Id. at 134).
When he arrived at the canal he saw a Commander Concrete flatbed Ford truck
submerged (R. 238: 135). Dibble took photographs of the truck and when he looked
6

inside he saw a broom that was positioned towards the gas pedal and then up onto the
driver's seat (Id. at 135-36). After the truck was removed from the canal h\ a tow
compam, Dibble inventoried the contents of the truck and called Henningsom ilvj truck's
owner who had previously reported it missing (Id. at 137-38). Dibble found "eight
chrome wing nuts for a valve coven a half-inch silver wrench, a piece of black hose and a
chrome screen" in a bucket in the bed of the truck (Id. at 137). Dibble testified that
Henningson denied ownership of any of these items (Id. at 138). Dibble also testified that
these items were eventually returned to their owner. Todd Hales (Id. at 141).
After the truck was taken to the impound yard, five visible finger prints w ere lifted
from it (R. 238: 143). The prints were rejected by the Crime Lab because of the poor
quality of the prints (Id. at 144).
Dibble testified that the distance between where the truck was ditched and
Mitchell's residence was approximately 5 miles, but that the distance between the Truck's
location and Tyler Archuleta's residence was only a mile "rough!) as the crow fic;T (R.
238: 147).
Dibble also went to Todd Hales' house on August 4, 2002 at approximate!} 8 a.m.
on a report of a vehicle burglary (Id. at 193). Dibble lifted a couple of fingerprints of the
Nova but the Crime Lab was unable to process them (Id. at 195).
During the defendant's case, Dibble testified that he was the lead officer on ihe
case involving the theft of the truck, the palm pilot and some auto parts but that until he
spoke with Archuleta on August 18. 2002 he had no leads on these thefts (R. 235: 77-78).
Archuleta did not mention to Dibble about 1 iving in Las Vegas (Id. at 78). Nor did he
write anything in his report about Archuleta telling him about a blue car following the
truck as it was stolen (Id. at 79). Dibble also testified that Archuleta had been told by
7

Mitchell that Archuleta's cousin, Jerald Haskel was driving the car that followed the truck
(Id. at 80).

D. Steve Adams
Steve Adams is an officer with the Spanish Fork Police Department (R. 238: 15051). Michael Atwood is his dentist and he knows the Atwood family (Id. at 151).
Adams testified that he became aware from another officer that there might be stolen
property at Mitchell's apartment (Id. at 172). On August 14, 2002 Adams went to
Mitchell's apartment and obtained consent from him to conduct a search (Id. at 151-52,
172). Adams located a palm pilot in the living room (Id.). The palm pilot was the type
that didn't have its own battery but a charging system and a cradle that was required to
see the information on it (Id. at 152). On August 22, 2002 Adams identified the palm
pilot as belonging to Atwood because he brought his charger to the station and "look the
palm pilot charged it up, opened it up and it ended up having his information on it" (Id.
at 152-53).
Adams didn't know if Archuleta was living in the apartment with Mitchell nor
who had handled the palm pilot or who had left it in the apartment (R. 238: 153-55).
Adams did not attempt to take finger prints off the palm pilot (Id. at 154-55). Adams
testified that Mitchell indicated that he had purchased it for "$300 among other items we
found in the apartment" (Id. at 155). Mitchell gave him the name "Berry7" as the seller but
Adams "was not able to actually find that person" (Id.). The other items consisted of
tackle boxes, a toolbox, cordless drill, fishing rod and reel, cd player and cd's; four of the
items were stolen goods (Id. at 173-74).
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E. Todd Hales
Todd Hales lives at 575 East 180 North in Salem (R. 238: 179). On a Sunca}
morning in August of 2002, he reported a theft at his residence to Dibble (Id. at : 79-80).
A 1970 Chevy Nova he was working on was cttore to pieces" and his motorcycle and its
saddlebags had been "ransacked" (Id. at 180, 187). It had been parked in the carport on
the right side of his house, visible from the front yard (Id. at 188). Missing from the car
was the "whole top of the engine, intake manifold, carburetor" (Id.). Two or three
months later the missing items were recovered and returned to him by the police (Id. at
181-82). Flales testified that he was also missing eight valve cover bolts and probably
some tools (Id. at 183-84). Some other parts were found b) Hales up the road, back to 5th
West and towards the canal (Id. at 191-92). Hales never heard a diesel engine that night
(Id. at 192).
Hales testified that his son. Brennan, and Tyler Archuleta used to be friend? f R.
238: 186-87). Hales testified that he may have told Archuleta about the car pans that had
been taken (Id. at 187).

F. Brad Bishop
Brad Bishop is a police officer for Salem City/ (R. 238: 196-97). On August 18.
2002 he received information that some stolen property was in a four-door Old^mobile at
the Mitchell Apartments, 32 East 300 South in Spanish Fork (Id. at 197-99). When he
arrived at the apartments, Bishop first made contact with Frank Mitchell, the apartment
owner who lived next door in a house (Id. at 198-99). Bishop told Frank about the report
and obtained permission to search the trunk of the vehicle (Id. at 199). ITe gained access
to the trunk through the removal of the backseat because Frank didn't have the key to the
9

trunk (Id. at 200). Inside the trunk, Bishop found an aluminum Edelbrock intake
manifold, a Quadrajet carburetor and some black speaker grills (Id. at 199-201).
Bishop set up an interview between Archuleta and Dibble; and that Mitchell and
Archuleta were friends (Id. at 204-05).

F. Frank Mitchell
Frank testified that Mitchell was a tenant of his in Spanish Fork in August of 2002
(R. 238: 207-08). At that time, Frank was in the process of evicting Mitchell because wChe
was behind on his rent and he had a bunch of other people living with him, men and
woman, both" (Id. at 208). Archuleta was one of the individuals living with Mitchell at
the time (Id. at 214).
Frank met with Bishop during that August (Id. at 209). He had a broken 1989
Oldsmobile that Mitchell and another tenant had been working on (Id.). Mitchell was
overhauling the whole motor (Id. at 213). Bishop told him that he was looking for auto
parts and requested permission to search the vehicle (Id. at 209-10). Frank gave
permission and indicated that he, too, had concerns "because I had been working on my
car. And there was a lot of new parts put in there, so I showed [Bishop] all the receipts
that I had documented, new parts that was in my vehicle" (Id. at 211). Frank didn": have
a key to the trunk because he had given it to Mitchell (Id.). When they got the backseat
out of the car, Frank watched Bishop remove several items from the trunk.

G. Tyler Archuleta
Tyler Archuleta testified that he is twenty years old and has lived in Salem with his
grandparents for most of his life (R. 235: 5-6). Archuleta has known Mitchell since
10

junior high and were verv good friends until 2002 (Id. at 6-7). In August of 2002.
Archuleta had just returned irom Las Vegas and was again living with his grandparents at
110 North, 500 East in Salem (Id. at 7-8).
Archuleta is familiar with Commander Concrete as one of its emplcnees. Cecil,
lives two houses down from his grandparents' house (Id. at 8). During August. Cecil's
truck "come up missing'* (Id.). Archuleta testified that he was outside having a smoke on
the corner between midnight and 4 a.m. when he saw "the truck pull out [of Cecil's
residence]. It stalled. lie took off, went up towards 180,1 believe and turned right" (Id.
at 8-10). He observed a "light bluish-colored car behind if (Id. at 26). Until trial, he had
not mentioned that it was a light blue car that followed (Id.). Archuleta put out his
cigarette and went back inside the house (Id. at 10-11, 23). The next morning he had a
conversation with Cecil about the truck being taken but didn't tell him he'd seen it drive
awaj (Id. at 31-32).
Archuleta subsequently had a conversation with Mitchell at his apartment in
Spanish Fork (Id. at 11-12). He remembers telling Mitchell that the "Commands:
Concrete truck down the road had been ganged" or stolen (Id. at 13). Archuleta then
testified that Mitchell told him. "there was a Commander Concrete truck the) were
around the other day. they were by when that particular-that particular night and he had
used a broomstick they used to ditch i f (Id. at 13). The broomstick had been wedged
between the seat and the gas pedal and they let the truck go into a canal, which Archuleta
figured had to be the Highline Canal (Id. at 13-14).
Archuleta also had a conversation with Mitchell at the Utah Count} Jail when he
went to visit with Mitchell who was incarcerated (Id. at 14-15). Archuleta testified that
during this conversation, Mitchell "asked me politely to get rid of some moior parts that
11

were in the trunk of a car" which was a brown Bonneville that belonged to Frank Mitchell
(Id. at 16). Archuleta said he told Mitchell he couldn't help him and that Mitchell told
him he was screwed then (Id.). Archuleta had assisted Mitchell in working on the car
previously, "put in a bolt" etc. (Id. at 32).
Archuleta eventually met with the police at the Salem Police Department (Id.). lie
spoke with Officer Dibble and told him about his conversations with Mitchell (Id. at 17).
Archuleta is no longer really friends with Mitchell (Id. at 17-18). Archuleta denied any
involvement in the theft of the truck or any other items that had been taken from the
neighborhood (Id. at 18-19).
To prepare for his testimony, Archuleta reviewed a report that had been prepared
by Dibble (Id. at 20).

H. John Taylor
John Taylor is a deputy with the Utah County Sheriffs Department (R. 235' 40).
Taylor is assigned to the jail and testified that on August 15, 2002 Mitchell was visiied b}
Archuleta for no more than 30 minutes per jail policy (Id. at 40-42).

I. Ron Jackson
Ron Jackson was previously employed as a police officer for Salem City (R. 235:
72). On August 4, 2002 at approximately 3:30 a.m. he was dispatched to a vehicle theft
in progress at 128 North 500 East (Id.). Approximately three minutes later he arrived at
the residence and made contact with the owner, Cecil Henningson; the vehicle was
already gone (Id. at 72-73). Jackson could not recall seeing anyone in the vicinity outside
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smoking a cigarette (Id. at 73-74). While he traveled to the residence, Jackson Kept his
eyes out for the truck but did not see it (Id. at 75-76).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mitchell asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for
new trial on both procedural and substantive grounds.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
HIS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Mitchell was convicted b> a jury of theft and criminal mischief, both second
degree felonies. Within ten days of sentencing-on October 18, 2004-he filed ? Motion
for New Trial alleging that jurors considered evidence not presented at trial in rendering
their decision, and on the basis of newly discovered evidence (R. 194). On November 8,
2004 the State filed a response alleging that the motion for new trial should be dismissed
because it was not accompanied by "affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in support
of the motion" (R. 197-99).
On November 12, 2004 Mitchell filed a request for an extension of time in which
to obtain and file all attachments necessary to his motion for a new trial, citing Rule 24(b)
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that, "If additional time is
required to procure affidavits or evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the
motion for such time as it deems reasonable" (R. 201-02).
On November 22, 2004 an affidavit from Brooke Karrington, a private
investigator, was filed by Mitchell in support of his motion for new trial (R. 203-05).
13

Karrington interviewed jurors and learned the following: One. that it was the consensus
of the jury that Archuleta was involved in the incident and that he'd been offered a
favorable deal from the State in exchange for his testimony against Mitchell. Two. that
this was an assumption made by the jury rather than gleamed directly from any evidence.
Three, that the jury was frustrated that the State had arranged a plea agreement with
Archuleta but not Mitchell.
On January 10, 2005 a second supporting affidavit of Karrington was filed b)
Mitchell (R. 208-11). In this affidavit, it was Karrington\s sworn statement based on an
interview with Cecil Henningson, the owner of the truck that formed the basis of the theft
charge. According to Karrington, Henningson told her the following: One, that Archuleta
lives on the same street but that he didn't know that until after the first court hearing.
Two, that Henningson had not met Archuleta until after that first hearing when he ran into
him in the neighborhood later that night or the next day. Three, that he did not see
Archuleta on the early morning of the incident as had been reported to police by
Archuleta. Four, that Henningson now believes that Archuleta was involved in the theft
and ransacking of his truck because of what he knows.
On August 2, 2005 Judge Laycock issued a written ruling denying Mitchell's
motion for a new trial (R. 222-30). One, the trial court denied the motion on procedural
grounds. Namely, that Mitchell's request to extend the time for the filing of supporting
affidavits was untimely under Rule 24( c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and
that accordingly, they should not be considered: "The rule does not allow the defendant to
drop off a one-paragraph motion at the courthouse to satisfy the first part of Rule 24( c)
and to then find the necessary evidence and prepare the affidavits at his leisure, as
happened in this case. Clearly the rule requires that the Court grant immediate permission
14

for and schedule such extensions of time, so that the matter is concluded as quickh as
possible" (R. 226).
Two. the trial court also denied the motion on substantive grounds:
One, Karrington's sworn statements contained in the affidavits were unreliable and
inadmissible. As to what she learned from interviews with un-named jurors, it is
inadmissible hearsay under Rules 80 L 802 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (Id.). And that
proper affidavits would have "included each juror's sworn and notarized testimony": and
that Karrington's "report of what some jurors said cannot be relied upon b\ the Court in
making its decision at this time" (R. 225). The trial court found the second affidavit to be
similarly deficient (Id.); and that Henningson\s opinion as to Archuleta's guilt was
inadmissible and irrelevant (Id.). Accordingly, the trial court denied the motion for new
trial on grounds that the two affidavits were only conjecture and inadmissible hearsay
(Id.).
Two. that "none of the submitted testimony persuades the Court that there was an}'
error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of the
defendant as per Rule 24(a)" (R. 224-25). In regards to the first affidavit about the jurv.
the trial court concluded that "the defendant has not demonstrated that the jury's
consideration that Mr. Archuleta had made a deal with the state in exchange for nis
testimony could have changed the outcome of the trial" namely because the jurors claims
were basically that Archuleta and Mitchell were both guilty (R. 224). As to the second
affidavit, the trial court concluded that wtthe defendant had ample opportunity at trial to
explore the facts claimed [in this affidavit] and to impeach the testimony of Mr.
Archuleta. There is no relevant or new evidence offered in her affidavit which would
justify a new trial."
15

A, The trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial on procedural grounds.
In her written ruling denying Mitchell's motion for a new trial Judge Laycock
concluded on procedural grounds that the motion was not timely. Namely, that Mitchell's
request to extend the time for the filing of supporting affidavits was untimely under Rule
24( c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and that accordingly, they should not be
considered: wThe rule does not allow the defendant to drop off a one-paragraph motion at
the courthouse to satisfy the first part of Rule 24( c) and to then find the necessary
evidence and prepare the affidavits at his leisure, as happened in this case. Clearly the
rule requires that the Court grant immediate permission for and schedule such extensions
of time, so that the matter is concluded as quickly as possible" (R. 226). In reaching this
conclusion, she cited to State v. Hanigan, 2002 UT App 424. Mitchell asserts that the
trial court's legal interpretation of Rule 24 is incorrect and that she abused her discretion
in denying his motion on procedural grounds.
Rule 24( c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, "A motion for
new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of sentence, or within such
further time as the court may fix during the ten-day period." Mitchell complied with
this rule by filing a motion for new trial on October 18, 2004 within the ten-day period.
In Hanigan, this was not the case. There the defendant failed to file a motion for new7
trial within the ten days and his request for an extension to file said motion was also
made outside of the proscribed ten day period.
In this case, Mitchell filed a timely motion for new trial. But he sought leave for
additional time within which to file supporting affidavits. He asserts that such additional
time to file supporting affidavits is not governed by subsection 24( c) but rather
subsection 24(b) of the same rule. Subsection 24(b) reads: "A motion for new trial shall
16

be made in writing and upon notice. The motion shall be accompanied b\ affidavits or
ev idence of the essential facts in support of the motion. If additional time is required to
procure affidavits or evidence the court ma\ postpone the hearing on the motion for
such time as it deems reasonable.'*
Mitchell filed in writing a motion for new trial and gave notice to the Stare of his
intent. Rule 24(b) clearly anticipates that more time may likely be required to secure all
of the necessary affidavits and other supporting evidence. That is all he was seeking
with the extension; and there is no requirement that such a request be made within the
initial ten-da> period as proscribed by subsection 24( c). Accordingly. he asserts that
the trial court erred in its legal interpretation of Rule 24 thus erroneously denying his
motion for new trial on procedural grounds. Any legal determinations which a trial
court makes as a basis for denying a motion for new trial are reviewed for correc:ness.
State v Loose. 2000 UT 1 K «J8, 994 P.2d 1237.

B. The trial court erred in denying his motion on substantive grounds.
Judge Laycock also denied Mitchelf s motion for new trial on substantive
grounds. She concluded that Karrington's sworn statements contained in the affidavits
were unreliable and inadmissible. As to what she learned from interviews with unnamed jurors, it is inadmissible hearsay under Rules 80 K 802 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence (Id.). And that proper affidavits would have "included each juror's sworn and
notarized testimony"; and that Karrington's "report of what some jurors said cannot be
relied upon by the Court in making its decision at this time" (R. 225). The trial court
found the second affidavit to be similarly deficient (Id.); and that Henningson's opinion
as to Archuleta's guilt was inadmissible and irrelevant (Id.). Accordingly, the trial court
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denied the motion for new trial on grounds that the two affidavits were only conjecture
and inadmissible hearsay (Id.).
Ultimately, however, she denied the motion based upon the her belief that 'Yione
of the submitted testimony persuades the Court that there was any error or impropriety
which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of the defendant as per Rule
24(a)"" (R. 224-25). In regards to the first affidavit about the jury, the trial court
concluded that "the defendant has not demonstrated that the jury's consideration that
Mr. Archuleta had made a deal with the state in exchange for his testimony could have
changed the outcome of the trial" namely because the jurors' claims were basically that
Archuleta and Mitchell were both guilty (R. 224). As to the second affidavit the trial
court concluded that "the defendant had ample opportunity at trial to explore the facts
claimed [in this affidavit] and to impeach the testimony of Mr. Archuleta. There is no
relevant or new evidence offered in her affidavit which would justify a new trial."
In Utah Cwa trial court may grant a motion for a new trial 'in the interest of justice
if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights
of a party/" State v. Kooyman, 2005 UT App 222, ^47, 112 P.2d 1252, cert denied, 125
P.3d 102 (quoting State v. Owens, 753 P.2d 976, 978 (Utah App. 1988)).
Mitchell asserts that the trial court abused her discretion in finding that a new trial
wasn't justified on the grounds of new evidence as it related to Archuleta, and to his tried
testimony in particular. At trial Archuleta was the only person who was able to link
Mitchell to the theft of the truck and supposedly he was an eye-witness to the theft
because he was outside his house smoking at the time the truck was taken. He testified
that he observed someone, followed by a blue car, remove the truck from Henningson's
driveway (R. 235: 8-10, 26). He also testified that Mitchell told him that "there was a
18

Commander Concrete truck the) were around the other day, they were b) wher that
particular-that particular night and he had used a broomstick the) used to ditch it" h\
w edging the broomstick between the seat and the gas pedal and then letting the truck go
into the canal (Id. at 13-14). In addition, Archuleta testified that he had a com ersaiion
about what he'd seen with Henningson later that morning (Id. at 31 -32).
Karringtoif s second affidavit details her conversation with Henningson about
Archuleta. In this affidavit it was Karringtoif s sworn statement, based on an interview
with Cecil Henningson, that Henningson had told her the following: One. that Archuleta
lives on the same street but that he didn't know that until after the first court hearing.
1 wo. that Henningson had not met Archuleta until after that first hearing when he ran into
him in the neighborhood later that night or the next da). Three, that he did not see
Archuleta on the earl) morning of the incident as had been reported to police by
Archuleta. Four, that Henningson now believes that Archuleta was in\ oh ed in the theft
and ransacking of his truck because of what he knows.
Henningson's statements to Karrington that he had never spoken w ith Archuleta
until after the first hearing in this case, along with the fact that he didn't see hLr, early
tiiat morning, is testimony that casts grave doubt on Archuleta's credibility and upon his
testimony that Mitchell was involved with the theft of the truck. According!), Mitchell
maintains that the interest of justice requires a new trial because there was a substantial
adverse effect upon his rights at trial as it pertains to the new evidence presented in his
motion for new trial concerning Archuleta's testimony.

19

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Giles asks this Court to reverse the trial courfs decision
and order a mistrial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of July. 2006.

IargarerP. Lindsa)
Counsel for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South,
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 3rd day of July, 2006.
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Rule 22

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

report is the subject of an appeal, the clerk shall include the
sealed presentence investigation report as part of the record
(c) Restitution
(c)(1) The presentence investigation report prepared by the
Department of Corrections shall include a specific statement
of pecuniary damages as provided m Utah Code Section
77-18 1(4) This statement shall include, but not be limited to,
a specific dollar amount recommended by the Department of
Corrections to be paid by the defendant to the victim(s)
(c)(2) In cases where a specific dollar value is not known,
and is not an accumulating amount, e g continuing medical
expenses, the court may continue the sentencing If sentenc
mg occurs, it shall be done with the concurrence of defense
counsel/defendant and the prosecutor and an agreement shall
be reached as to how restitution shall be determined In no
instance shall the restitution amount be determined by the
Department of Corrections without approval of the court,
defendant, defense counsel and the prosecutor If the parties
disagree about the restitution amount, a restitution hearing
shall be scheduled
R u l e 22. S e n t e n c e , j u d g m e n t and c o m m i t m e n t .
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no
contest, the court shall set a time for imposing sentence which
shall be not less t h a n two nor more than 45 days after the
verdict or plea, unless the court, with the concurrence of the
defendant, otherwise orders Pending sentence, the court may
commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recog
nizance
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any
information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal
cause why sentence should not be imposed The prosecuting
attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any
information material to the imposition of sentence
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in
defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced m
defendant's absence If a defendant fails to appear for sen
tence, a w a r r a n t foi defendant's arrest may be issued by the
court
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the
court shall impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of
conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict, if any,
and the sentence Following imposition of sentence the court
shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal and
the time within which any appeal shall be filed
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court
shall issue its commitment setting forth the sentence The
officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall
deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or prison and
shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it
with the court
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the
court shall impose sentence m accordance with Title 77,
Chapter 16a, Utah Code If the court retains jurisdiction over
a mentally ill offender committed to the Department of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann § 7 7-16a202(l)(b), the court shall so specify m the sentencing order
Rule 23. Arrest of j u d g m e n t .
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court
upon its own initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant
shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or admitted do not
constitute a public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, or
there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment Upon
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arresting judgment the court may, unless a judgment
acquittal of the offense charged is entered or jeopardy n
attached, order a commitment until the defendant is charged
anew or retned, or may enter any other order as may he j u
and proper under the circumstances
Rule 24. Motion for n e w trial.
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own
initiative, grant a new trial m the interest of justice if there
any error or impropriety which had a substantial advers
effect upon the rights of a party
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made m writing Q^A
upon notice The motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or
evidence of the essential facts m support of the motion If
additional time is required to procure affidavits or evidence
the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such
time as it deems reasonable
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days
after imposition of sentence, or within such further time as the
court may fix during the ten day period
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be m the same
position as if no trial had been held and the former verdict
shall not be used or mentioned either in evidence or m
argument
Rule 25. Dismissal w i t h o u t trial.
(a.) In its discretion, for substantial cause and m further
ance of justice, the court may, either on its own initiative or
upon application of either party, order an information or
indictment dismissed
(b) The court shall dismiss the information or indictment
when
(b)(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay w
bringing defendant to trial,
(b)(2) The allegations of the mformation or indictment,
together with any bill of particulars furnished in support
thereof, do not constitute the offense intended to be charged in
the pleading so filed,
(b)(3) It appears t h a t there was a substantial and prejudi
cial defect in the impaneling or in the proceedings relating to
the grand jury,
(b)(4) The court is without jurisdiction, or
(b)(5) The prosecution is barred by the statute of hmita
tions
(c) The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set forth in
an order and entered in the minutes
(d) If the dismissal is based upon the grounds that there
was unreasonable delay, or the court is without jurisdiction, or
the offense was not properly alleged in the information or
indictment, or there was a defect in the impaneling or of the
proceedings relating to the grand jury, further prosecution for
the offense shall not be barred and the court may make such
orders with respect to the custody of the defendant pending
the filing of new charges as the interest of justice may require
Otherwise the defendant shall be discharged and bail exonerated
An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in
bringing the defendant to trial or based upon the statute oJ
limitations, shall be a bar to any other prosecution for thf
offense charged
(e) In misdemeanor cases, upon motion of the prosecutor
the court may dismiss the case if it is compromised by tin
defendant and the injured party The injured party shall firs
acknowledge the compromise before the court or m writing
The reasons for the order shall be set forth therein an
entered in the minutes The order shall be a bar to anothe
prosecution for the same offense, provided however, to*

RICHARD P. GALE (7054)
ANTHONY L. HOWELL (9506)
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
Attorneys for Defendant
245 North University Ave.
Provo,UT 84601
Telephone: 852-1070
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 021403847

vs.
Judge Claudia Laycock
ROBERT MITCHELL,
Defendant.

Comes now, defendant Robert Mitchell, by and through counsel, Richard P. Gale
and Anthony L. Howell, and Moves this court to grant the defendant a new trial. Defense
counsel has learned that during deliberation jurors considered evidence not presented at trial in
making their decision, which consideration violates Rule 24 of Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Defense counsel is also investigation the possibility that additional evidence
may exist which was not available at the time of trial. Defendant requests an evidenj&ry
hearing.
DATED this /o

day of October, 2004.

Richard P. Gale
Anthony L. Howell
Counsel for Defendant.

MAILING CERTIFICATE

X?
I hereby certify that I mailed postage prepaid this ' Q
the foregoing MOTION IN LIMINE to the following:
David Sturgill
150 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84601

pn^j^^ .j

day of October, 2004, a copy of

RICHARD P. GALE (7054)
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
245 North University Avenue
Provo.UT 84601
Telephone: (801) 379-2570

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO EXTEND TIME
TO SUBMIT AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL

vs.
ROBERT MITCHELL,
Defendant.

Case No. 021403847
JUDGE CLAUDIA LAYCOCK

Defendant, ROBERT MITCHELL, by and through his counsel of record, Richard P. Gale, moves
the Court to allow defendant until November 19, 2004 to file affidavit's in support of Defendant's
Motion for a New Trial. This motion is made based on the following facts:
1.

Defendant's investigator, Brooke Karrington, has spoken with the majority of the jurors involved

in the case. Each of the jurors has agreed that during deliberations and in making their decision they
considered the fact that they believed that the state's witness Tyler Archuleta had also been charged with
the same offense as Defendant and worked out a deal with the state in exchange for his testimony. No
evidence of this fact was ever presented by either party at trial.
2.

Ms. Karrington will provide an affidavit supporting the above facts to Defendant's attorneys by

Monday, November 15, 2004.

3.

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 34(b) provides, "If additional time is required to procure

affidavits or evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it deems
reasonable."
WHEREFORE, defendant requests that the court allow defendant until Friday^November 19,
2004 to supplement Defendant's motion with the supporting affidavit.
DATED this

**

day of Novenjb^fi

^ J
Richard P. Gale
Attorney for Defendant

''

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered a copy of the foregoing Motion to David
Sturgil at the Office of the Utah County Attorney, 100 Eas^J2€nteh Suite 2100, Pr/>vo, UT 84606,
this
1 " ^ d a y of November, 2004.
/
/

/

/
fi J /

;;
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Anthony D. Howell
Utah County Public Defender Association
Attorney for Defendant
245 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84601
801.852.1070
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL

Plaintiff,
vs
ROBERT D. MITCHELL

Case# 021403847
>

Defendant
State of Utah

)

County of Salt Lake )
BROOKE KARRINGTON, upon her oath, swears and deposes as follows
1 I am a licensed private investigator in the State of Utah, and,
2. I interviewed jurors of the Robert Mitchell jury trial in which Mr Mitchell
was convicted, and,
3. jurors told me that there was a consensus that the state's witness, Tyler
Archuletta, was definitely involved in this incident, and,
4 jurors told me that during their deliberations that the jurors had concluded that
the state's witness, Tyler Archuletta, was testifying against Mr Mitchell in
exchange for a reduction in his (Mr Archuletta's) own charges, and,

5 jurors also told me that there was never any testimony or evidence that
indicated Mr

Archuletta had been charged or had negotiated a plea

agreement, just that they had assumed that this was the case, and,
6 jurors also told me that the consensus was frustration that the state had
arranged a plea agreement with Mr Archuletta but not with Mr Mitchell, and,

7 Further, affiant sayeth not

Signed f W f e f

iAAMyj

4f'

Brooke Karrington
Karrington Investigations, Inc.
Utah Private Investigator License #100004

Dated this

{I

day of November 2004

I do affirm and certify, under applicable laws regarding false and misleading
written statements, that I have read all of this Affidavit, and that I have executed
this Affidavit, and that the facts as set forth in this Affidavit are true and correct to
the best of my knowledge, information and belief
' /I

Signed

{ ^ t ^ ^ ^ H i W .
Brooke Karrington
Karrington Investigations, Tfoc.
Utah Private Investigator License # 100004

On the

/^

day of November 2004, personally appeared before me, Brooke

Karrington, who acknowledged to me that she is the person who executed the
foregoing Affidavit

Signed

S ^ C ^ / ^

CJ^^

Kimberlee Clem
Notary Public

My commission expires } "2- 3 ( - & 7

ANTHONY L. HOWELL
Utah County Public Defender Association
Attorney for Defendant
245 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84601
801.852.1070
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT D. MITCHELL
Defendant.

)
)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL

)
)
)

Case# 021403847

A

/^

State of Utah

)
. ss
County of Salt Lake )
BROOKE KARRINGTON, upon her oath, swears and deposes as follows:
1. I am a licensed private investigator in the State of Utah, and,
2. 1 interviewed Cecil Dustin Henningson, the victim and a state's trial witness
in this matter, and,
3. my interview with Mr. Henningson took place via telephone after the trial had
taken place, and,
4. Mr. Henningson stated to me that Tyler Archuletta, another state's witness in
this matter, lives on the same street as Mr. Henningson, but he did not know
that until after what he termed "the first court hearing", and,

5. Mr. Henningson had never met Mr. Archuletta until after "the first court
hearing", and,
6 Mr Henningson stated that he "ran into Tyler in the neighborhood later that
night or the next day" after the "first court hearing", and,
7

Mr Henningson stated that he did not see Tyler Archuletta at 3:00 a.m. the
morning of the incident, as Mr Archuletta stated to the police in the reports,
and,

8. Mr Henningson firmly believes that Tyler Archuletta was involved in the
theft and the subsequent ransacking of his truck, and theft of items from the
truck, because of the detail of the incident that Mr. Archuletta knows, and,
9. Further, affiant sayeth not.

Signed

' V^(r\U.

JJfr^ASr*~~

Brooke Karrington
Dated

"7^

\

day of I ^ M ^ r f

I do affirm and certify, under applicable laws regarding false and misleading
written statements, that I have read all of this Affidavit, and that I have executed
this Affidavit, and that the facts as set forth in this Affidavit are true and correct to
the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

signed ^hmkL J a v ^ u —
Brooke Karrington

O n the

~7

day of BeeembW 2004," personally appeared before me, Brooke

Karrington, who acknowledged to me that she is the person who executed the
foregoing Affidavit

Signed

A *, ^i-tJ^ L
Kimberlee Clem
Paralegal
Notary Public
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Fourth Juti'c*1 District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COlJNTY, STATE OF UTAH
1 STATE OF UTAH,

RULING REGARDING DEFENDANT'S
1 MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Plaintiff,

Y.

ROBERT MITCHELL
Defendant.

Date: August 2, 2005
Case No. 021403847
Judge Claudia Laycock
Division 2

This matter comes before the court upon the defendant's Motion For New Trial,
submitted to the Court on May 18, 2005. The defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts:
(1) theft and (2) criminal mischief-both second-degree felonies. The defendant seeks a new trial
and alleges the following: (1) the jurors, during deliberation, considered evidence not presented
at trial in making their decision in violation of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure;
and (2) the State's key witness, Tyler Archuleta, provided testimony at trial that was inconsistent
with statements he had made previously to the police.
PROCEDURE HISTORY
1. On September 30, 2002 the state filed an information charging the defendant with
theft, a second degree felony, and criminal mischief, a second degree felony.
2. On August 23 and 24, 2004 a jury trial was held regarding the theft and criminal
mischief charges.
3. On August 24, 2004 the jury found the defendant guilty of both charges.
4. On October 7, 2004 the defendant was sentenced.

5. On October 18, 2004 the defendant filed a Motion for New Trial The defendant cited
two grounds for granting his motion: (1) defense counsel "learned that during deliberation jurors
considered evidence not presented at trial in making their decision;" and (2) defense counsel
needed to investigate "the possibility that additional evidence may exist which was not available
at the time of trial." (See Motion for New Trial) Neither a memorandum nor any affidavits
accompanied the motion.
6. On November 8, 2004 the state filed its response to the motion, arguing that the
defendant had not complied with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
7. On November 12, 2004 the defendant filed its Motion to Extend Time to Submit
Affidavits in Support ofDefendant's Motion for a New Trial, requesting until November 19, 2004
to file the necessary affidavits. The defendant did not file a notice to submit, nor did he provide
an order for the Court's signature. The Court never ruled upon the motion to extend time.
8. On November 22, 2004 the defendant filed a supportive affidavit from Brooke
Karrington, a licensed private investigator, who had interviewed some of the jurors who
participated in the defendant's trial.
9. On January 10, 2005 the defendant filed a second affidavit from Brooke Karrington,
who had interviewed Cecil Dustin Henningson, a witness at the trial.
10. On February 15, 2005 the state filed its Amended Response to Defendant's Motion
for a New Trial
11. On May 18, 2005 the defendant filed his Motion to Submit for Decision.
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supporting "affidavits or evidence of the essential facts," nor did he request additional time to file
such documents during the 10-day period following the defendant's sentencing hearing.2
The defendant's October 18, 2004 motion consisted of a one-paragraph request:
Comes now, defendant Robert Mitchell, by and through counsel, Richard
P. Gale and Anthony L. Howell, and Moves this court to grant the defendant a
new trial. Defense counsel has learned that during deliberation jurors considered
evidence not presented at trial in making their decision, which consideration
violates Rule 24 of Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Defense counsel is also
investigation the possibility that additional evidence may exist which was not
available at the time of trial. Defendant requests an evidentiary hearing, (sic)
It was not until November 12, 2004 that the defendant filed his motion to extend time,
which motion was really prompted by the state's arguments that the defendant's motion lacked
the necessary affidavits and other supporting evidence. The motion to extend time was never
granted by the Court, as no notice to submit was filed and the matter was not properly submitted
to the Court. The defendant did not file the supporting affidavits until November 22, 2004 and
January 10, 2005-31 and 80 days, respectively, after the 10-day time period had run on October
22, 2004. The defendant never filed a memorandum explaining his theories regarding the facts
alleged in the affidavits.
The Court concludes that, even had the defendant properly requested that the Court rule
on his motion to extend time, the Court could not have granted the motion to extend time under

2

For a discussion of the time limitations of Rule 24, please turn to a "not for official
publication" per curiam decision which very succinctly explains the time restraints of this rule
and the filing of supporting affidavits. See Utah v. Hanigan, 2002 UT App. 424; 2002 Utah
App. LEXIS 280, filed December 12, 2002. Apparently, the Court of Appeals believes that Rule
24's time limitations are so easily understood that publication of such a helpful opinion was not
necessary.
4

DISCUSSION
A. Timeliness of Defendant's Motion for New Trial
"The decision to grant or deny a new trial is a matter of discretion with the trial court and
will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion." State v. Pirela, 65 P.3d 307, 310
(Utah App. 2003) {quoting State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985)). The Court must
first consider whether the defendant filed a timely Motion for New Trial according to Rule 24 of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 24 (a), (b), and (c) provide as follows:
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a new trial
in the interest ofjustice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial
adverse effect upon the rights of a party.
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The motion
shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essentialfacts in support of the
motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or evidence the court may
postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it deems reasonable.
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of
sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day period.
See U. R. Cr. P. 24(a), (b), and (c) (2004) (emphasis added).
The rule clearly provides that the defendant must file a motion, together with any
supporting affidavits or evidence, within 10 days of imposition of the sentence. The defendant
was sentenced on October 7, 2004 and then filed his Motion for New Trial on October 18, 2004—
well within the 10-day time limit.1 Unfortunately, he did not simultaneously file the requisite

'As per Rule 2 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant's deadline for
filing the motion was Friday, October 22, 2004. The intervening weekends and the Columbus
Day holiday would not have been included in the computation of time.
i

Rule 24(c), as that motion should have been filed during the 10-day period following the
defendant's sentencing hearing, as per the second part of Rule 24(c). The rule does not allow the
defendant to drop off a one-paragraph motion at the courthouse to satisfy the first part of Rule 24
(c) and to then find the necessary evidence and prepare the affidavits at his leisure, as happened
in this case. Clearly, the rule requires that the Court grant immediate permission for and
schedule such extensions of time, so that the matter is concluded as quickly as possible.
For these procedural reasons, the Court denies the defendant's motion for new trial.
B. The Affidavits
Although the Court has already denied the motion for new trial on procedural grounds,
the Court will, nevertheless, address the merits of the motion. Although the defendant's motion
for new trial requested an evidentiary hearing, the notice to submit requested that the Court
"review defendant's Motion and Affidavits in Support and the state's Response and render a
decision on Defendant's Motion for a New Trial." See defendant's Motion to Submit for
Decision. Therefore, the Court has not set this matter for an evidentiary hearing and has
reviewed the evidence before it, as found in the affidavits submitted by defendant. The Court
finds that neither affidavit can be considered by the Court, as each is based upon hearsay and
conjecture.
Brooke Karrington's first affidavit, filed on November 22, 2004, says that she
interviewed "jurors of the Robert Mitchell jury trial," but never includes their names or how
many jurors she interviewed. Furthermore, her version of what these unknown jurors said is
clearly inadmissible hearsay under Rules 801 and 802 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Proper
5

affidavits in support of the defendant's theory would have included each juror's sworn and
notarized testimony. Ms. Karrington's report of what some jurors said cannot be relied upon by
the Court in making its decision in this matter.
Ms. Karrington's second affidavit, filed on January 10, 2005, says that she interviewed
Cecil Dustin Henningson after the trial by telephone. Although this affidavit contains much
more detail than the earlier affidavit, the hearsay problems are exactly the same. A proper
affidavit would have included Mr. Henningson's sworn and notarized testimony, not Ms.
Karrington's version of what he told her. Again, the Court cannot rely upon such an affidavit in
making its decision in this matter.
In addition, paragraph 8 of this paragraph contains Mr. Henningson's inadmissible belief
as to the alleged guilt of one of the other witnesses, Tyler Archuleta. Had such an opinion been
offered at trial, the state would have objected and the Court would have sustained the objection.
Mr. Henningson's personal belief as to Mr. Archuleta's or the defendant's guilt or innocence is
irrelevant; only the jury could make that final decision.
Therefore, the Court also denies the motion for new trial on the grounds that the two
affidavits contained nothing more than inadmissible hearsay and conjecture.
C Assumptions Made by the Jury
Had the motion for an extension of time been timely filed and had the affidavits
contained admissible testimony from the jurors and other witnesses, the Court would have still
denied the motion for new trial. None of the submitted testimony persuades the Court that there
was any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of the
6

defendant, as per Rule 24(a).
Ms. Karrington reports in her first affidavit that the jury assumed during deliberations that
Tyler Archuleta had been involved in the incident and had made a deal with the state in
exchange for his testimony. The unnamed jurors were also, apparently, frustrated that "the state
had arranged a plea agreement with Mr. Archuleta but not with Mr. Mitchell." (See Ms.
Karrington's first affidavit, paragraph 5.) Without an explanatory memorandum from defendant,
the Court can only assume that the defendant's argument is that these assumptions made by the
jury somehow prejudiced the jury against him and, therefore, there was an error or impropriety
which had a substantial adverse effect upon his rights, as per Rule 24(a).
In State v. Becker, the Court of Appeals stated that "to justify a new trial, newly
discovered evidence should clarify a fact that was contested and resolved against the movant, or
be sufficiently persuasive that the result of the trial might be changed." Becker at 1294. Here,
the defendant has not demonstrated that the jury's conclusion that Mr. Archuleta had made a deal
with the state in exchange for his testimony could have changed the outcome of the trial. If the
jurors' claims to Ms. Karrington were relied upon by the Court, it could only appear to the Court
that the jury concluded that both Mr. Archuleta and the defendant were guilty of the alleged
crimes. Despite the claim that the jury wanted similar deals to have been offered to both men,
the jury looked at the facts and found the defendant guilty.
Furthermore, the defendant's rights were not substantially and adversely affected. The
jury's conclusion that Mr. Archuleta was guilty was introduced and forcefully advocated by the
defendant. Defendant's attorney proposed his theory of the case during closing arguments, as
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pointed out by the state's responsive memorandum, placing the blame squarely on Mr. Archuleta.
(See trial transcript, day two, p. 128.) Defendant is not entitled to a new trial because, in his
opinion, the jury failed to place all responsibility on Mr. Archuleta and to absolve the defendant
of all culpability. The Court concludes that there was no impropriety or error in the trial
proceedings which would justify granting the defendant's motion.
D. Alleged Inconsistent Testimony of a Witness
Ms. Karrington's second affidavit states that the state's witness, Tyler Archuleta, told the
police that he saw the victim, Mr. Henningson, at 3:00 a.m. the morning of the theft, while Mr.
Henningson stated at trial that he did not see Mr. Archuleta. Aside from the fact that Ms.
Karrington reports inadmissible hearsay evidence to the Court from the police incident reports, it
is clear to the Court that both parties had the opportunity to examine and cross-examine Mr.
Henningson and Tyler Archuleta about these facts. It was Mr. Henningson's testimony at trial
that he saw no one else outside when he went outside at 3:00 a.m. (Trial transcript of testimony
of Cecil Henningson, p.22.) Mr. Archuleta testified on direct examination that he did not see Mr.
Henningson that night. (Trial transcript, day two, p. 11.) On cross-examination he also testified
that he did not see Mr. Henningson "come running out of his house." (Id. at p. 29.) Both parties
took advantage of the opportunity to question both witnesses about these particular facts; Ms.
Karrington's affidavit offers no new evidence which was not or could not have been explored by
the parties at the time of trial.
In addition, the Court finds that paragraphs four through six of Ms. Karrington's affidavit
contain hearsay evidence that would make absolutely no difference to the jury. When or where
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Mr. Henningson may have run into Mr. Archuletta for the first time after the "first court hearing"
is of no relevance or importance to the trier of fact in this matter, and the fact that they both lived
on the same street was well explored at trial.
The defendant had ample opportunity at trial to explore the facts claimed in Ms.
Karrington's second affidavit and to impeach the testimony of Mr. Archuleta. There is no
relevant or new evidence offered in her affidavit which would justify a new trial.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, the Court denies the defendant's Motion For New Trial. The Court orders the
state to prepare and submit appropriate findings, conclusions, and order, pursuant to Rule 26 of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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